Subprime mortgages + CDO

[Honzajs]

Stahuji kapitál z put MBI (+300% za měsíc), plus i nějaké zisky.
Za zisky kupuji put na JPM, strike 37.5, exp. Jan 2008 - cena 2.2

Tak jsem zvědav.

[kadu]

Vzhledem k nejiste situaci v bankovnim sektoru (spise to vypada na pokles) prodavam cast svych bankovnich akcii, jmenovite:
Bank Of America - BAC
CitiGroup - C

Uvolneny kapital pujde s nejvetsi pravdepodobnosti to zlatych akcii

PS: Stale mam ve svem portofliu docela velke procento bankovnich akcii [UK]

[Honzajs]

V porovnání s bankovním ETFkem RKH mají extrémně levné srovnatelné put opce (spaltnost + % vzdálenost od strike) JPM a BAC či C- 1/2 až 1/4 ceny.

je to zřejmě proto, že obě tyto banky zatím nehlásily žádné derivátové ztráty, ačkoliv patří mezi TOP 5 bank s největším objemem derivátů ve svém portfoliu.

Teď se na to vyspím - ráno moudější večera - jestli nahradím put na RKH třeba putem na BAC

V úvahu je třeba brát ještě jeden faktor - % OTC derivátových kontraktů v portfoliu.
Tam banka může dosáhnout ztráty nejen při špatném úsudku, ale i při dobrém, pokud to položí protistanu a ona stejně nic nedostane.

[Honzajs]

Komentář od jinud - ještě není konec.

The mortgage crisis…

Today, we take a break from our normal format to answer in detail a question that must be on the minds of nearly all of our readers, as expressed by paid-up subscriber David Walker:

I have recently read two items from your group (Graham Summers and Tom Dyson) that mentioned that insiders at mortgage companies had been buying shares in their own companies in large chunks as recently as the end of July. It was particularly interesting to me that Tom Dyson told us that Garrett Thornburg bought several million dollars of Thornburg Mortgage at that time (in his note telling us to sell the stock... immediately). It's interesting because Thornburg Mortgage has been in freefall for the past few days. Since insider buying is supposed to be a good indicator that a bottom is somewhere close, and assuming these insiders weren't expecting to lose 30 or 40% of their money in just a few weeks, I wonder if something very unusual is going on in these markets. Why were these guys so wrong this time? Why couldn't they see problems that were just weeks away when normally than can? What are the implications going forward? I believe you guys are among the best stock pickers around. That's why I find it so interesting that you recommended both American Home Mortgage and Thornburg Mortgage as "...Stocks to Retire With" (of all things) not too long before AHM went bankrupt and TMA started heading in that direction. What is so unusual about the current times that so many smart people could be so catastrophically wrong?

Porter comment: What happened (and what is still happening) is simply leverage in reverse, or what people used to call a "run on the bank." But… I think a great more detail would be helpful for you to understand. Please excuse the intricacies: None of this stuff is very easy to understand the first time you think about it. I'll try to avoid using any jargon…

For nearly 10 years, as interest rates fell from 1995 to 2005, the mortgage and housing business boomed as more and more capital found its way into housing. With lower rates, more people could afford to buy houses. That was good. Unfortunately, it didn't take long for some people to figure out that with rates so low, they could buy more than one. Or even nine or 10. As more money made its way into housing, prices for real estate went up – 20% a year for several years in some places. The higher prices created more equity… that could then be used as collateral for still more debt. This is what leads to a bubble.

Banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies were happy to fund the madness because they believed new "financial engineering" could take lower-quality home loans (like the kind with zero down payment) and transform these very risky loans, made at the top of the market, into AAA-rated securities. Let me go into some detail about how this worked.

Wall Street's biggest banks (Goldman Sachs, Lehman Bros., Bear Stearns) would buy, say, $500 million worth of low-quality mortgages, underwritten by a mortgage broker, like NovaStar Financial. The individual mortgages – thousands of them at a time – were organized by type and geographic location into a new security, called a residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS). Unlike a regular bond, whose coupon is paid by a single corporation and organized by maturity date, RMBS securities were organized into risk levels, or "tranches." Thousands of homeowners paid the interest and principal for each tranche. Rating agencies (like Moody's) and other financial analysts, believed these large bundles of mortgages would be safer to own because the obligation was spread among thousands of separate borrowers and organized into different risk categories that, in theory, would protect the buyers. For example, the broker (like NovaStar) that originated the mortgages would be on the hook for any early defaults, which typically only occurred in fraudulently written mortgages. After that risk padding, the next 3%-5% of the defaults would be taken out of the "equity slice" of the RMBS.

The "equity slice" was the riskiest part of the RMBS. It was typically sold at a wide discount to the total value of the loans in this category, meaning that if defaults were less than expected, the buyer of this part of the package could make a capital gain in addition to a very high yield. Even if defaults were average, the buyer would still earn a nice yield. Hedge funds loved this kind of security because the yield on it would cover the interest on the money the fund would borrow to buy it. Hedge funds could make double-digit capital gains annually, cost-free and risk-free… or so they thought. As long as home prices kept rising and interest rates kept falling, almost every RMBS was safe. Even if a buyer got into trouble, he could still sell his home for more than he paid or find a way to restructure the debt. On the way up, from 1995-2005, there were very few defaults. Everyone made money, which attracted still more money into the market.

After the equity tranche, typically one or two more risk levels offered higher yields at a lower-than-AAA rating. After those few, thin slices, the vast majority of the RMBS – usually 92% of the loan package – would be rated AAA. With an AAA rating, banks, brokerage firms, and insurance companies could own these mortgages – even the exotic mortgages with changing interest rates or no down payments. With the magic of financial engineering and by ordering the perceived risk, financial firms from all over the world could fill their balance sheets with higher-yielding mortgage debt that would pass muster with the regulators charged with making sure they held only the safest assets in reserve.

For a long time, this arrangement worked well for everyone. Wall Street's banks made a fortune packaging these securities. They even added more layers of packaging – creating CDOs (collateralized debt obligation) and ABSs (asset-backed security) – which are like mutual funds that hold RMBS.

Buyers of these securities did well, too. Hedge funds made what looked like risk-free profits in the equity tranche for years and years.

Insurance companies, banks, and brokers were able to earn higher returns on assets by buying RMBS, CDOs, or ABSs instead of Treasury bonds or AAA-rated corporate debt. And because the collateral was considered AAA, financial institutions of all stripes were able to increase the size of their balance sheets by continuing to borrow against their RMBS inventory. This, in turn, supplied still more money to the mortgage market, which kept the mortgage brokers busy. Remember all the TV ads to refinance your mortgage and the teaser rate loans?

The cycle kept going – more mortgage securities, more leverage, more loans, more housing – until one day the marginal borrower blinked. We'll never know whom or why… but somewhere out there, the "greater fool" failed to close on that next home or condo. Beginning in about the summer of 2005, the momentum began to slow… and then slowly… imperceptibly… it began to shift.

All the things the cycle had going for it from 1995 to 2005 began to turn the other way. Leverage, in reverse, is devastating.

The first sign of trouble was an unexpectedly high default rate in subprime mortgages. Beginning in early 2007, studies of 20-month-old subprime mortgages showed a default rate greater than 5%, much higher than expected. According to Countrywide Mortgage, the default rates on the riskiest loans made in 2005 and 2006 is expected to grow to as high as 20% – a new all-time record. The big jump in subprime defaults led to the first hedge-fund blowups, such as the May 2007 shutdown of Dillon Reed Capital Management, which lost $150 million in subprime investments in the first quarter of 2007.

Since Dillon Reed Capital, dozens of more funds have blown up as the "equity slice" in mortgage securities collapsed. Remember, these equity tranches were supposed to be the "speed bumps" that protected the rest of the buyers. With the safety net of the equity tranche removed, these huge securities will have to be downgraded by the rating agencies. For example, on July 10, Moody's and Standard and Poor's downgraded $12 billion of subprime-backed securities. On August 7, the same agencies warned that another $1 billion of "Alt-A" mortgage securities would also likely be downgraded.

Now… these downgrades and hedge-fund liquidations have hugely important consequences. Why? Because as hedge funds have to liquidate, they must sell their RMBSs, CDOs, and ABSs. This pushes prices for these securities down, which results in margin calls on other hedge funds that own the same troubled instruments. That, in turn, pushes them to sell, too.

Very quickly the "liquidity" – the amount of willing buyers for these types of mortgage-backed securities – disappeared. There are literally no bids for much of this paper. That's why the subprime mortgage brokers – the Novastars and Fremonts – went out of business so quickly. Not only did they take a huge hit paying off the early defaults of their 2005 and 2006 mortgages, but the loans they held on their books were marked down, with no buyers available and their creditors demanded greater margin cover on their lines of credit… poof… The assets they owned were marked down, they couldn't be readily sold, and they had no access to additional capital.

The failure of the subprime-mortgage structure – which started with higher-than-expected defaults, led to hedge-fund wipeouts and then to mortgage broker bankruptcies – might have been contained to only the subprime segment of the market. That's why we jumped in during late spring and recommended the higher-quality mortgage firms, such as Thornburg and American Home. We believed that the higher quality of these firms' underwriting would prevent a similar run on the bank.

But… the risk spread because of the financial engineering.

With Wall Street wrapping together thousands of mortgages from different underwriters, it's likely that hundreds of financial institutions around the world have traces of bad subprime and Alt-A mortgage debt on their books. Parts of these CDOs were rated AAA. Almost any financial institution could own them – especially hedge funds. Hedge fund investors quickly figured this out – and asked for their money back.

And so, in July, liquidity fears began to creep through the entire mortgage complex. Not because the mortgages themselves were all bad or even because the mortgage securities were all bad – but because all the market players knew a wave of selling, led by hedge funds, was on the way. Nobody wants to be the first buyer when they know thousands of sellers are lined up behind them.

The market "locked up." Nobody would buy mortgage bonds. And everyone needed to sell. Suddenly even Wall Street's biggest banks – the very firms that created these mortgage securities – were suffering huge losses, as the bonds kept getting marked down as hedge funds and other leveraged speculators had to sell into a panicked market. In this liquidation, even solid firms, like American Home and Thornburg, were trapped owning new mortgages they couldn't sell to Wall Street. Meanwhile their banks, worried about the collapsing prices of mortgages, demanded greater collateral.

It's a classic "run on the bank," except today the function of the traditional bank has been spread out among several institutions: mortgage brokers, Wall Street security firms, hedge-fund investors, and banks. The real problem is that the long-dated liabilities (a 30-year mortgage) were matched not by reliable depositors, but by fly-by-night hedge funds, which were themselves highly leveraged and subject to redemptions.

That's why even as the top executives in these firms believed their mortgages were safe and sound, they can't get the funding they need to hold onto them through the crisis. As Keynes predicted, the lives of every higher-leveraged financial institution is precarious: "The market can be irrational longer than you can remain solvent."

The hedge funds have no solution. Redemptions will force them to sell. They'll continue to pressure the market, resulting in huge losses. Hundreds of funds will likely be liquidated.

Wall Street's investment firms, if they can find additional capital to meet margin calls, might weather the storm… depending on how far it spreads. We saw a move in this direction yesterday when Goldman announced $3 billion in additional funding for its big hedge funds.

For most mortgage brokers, the party is over – goodnight. Something like 90% of them will be out of business by the end of the year.

The only chance they have to survive is very conservative underwriting (which might result in a premium for their mortgage securities) and lots of additional funding. Delta Financial, for example, is renowned for its very conservative underwriting, which requires a substantial (20%) downpayment. The company raised $70 million last week from two investors (one of which is our friend, Mohnish Pabrai) to hang on to its $5.6 billion in on-balance-sheet mortgages. The stock is up 14.5% on the news today. Will it be enough capital? It's very hard to say. It depends on whether or not the company is able to sell some of its mortgages to raise cash. It depends on whether or not it is downgraded further and the firm receives additional margin calls.

I wouldn't be surprised to see Thornburg take a similar step – raising funds from existing shareholders. But, for now, Wall Street remains very skeptical the firm will survive. Its shares are down another 46% today.

As analysts, what we got wrong was how far the crisis would spread. We thought by buying the most respected firms with the best underwriting, we could avoid the subprime train wreck. What we didn't know was how far the subprime sludge had been spread via mortgage securities. The insiders at these firms made the same mistake. They assumed by operating conservatively their businesses would retain a premium price on their mortgage and better access to capital. But in a panic, the baby is often thrown out with the bathwater.

And… we have to consider one more thing. Nobody knows right now how far the crisis will spread. It could certainly get worse. As these mortgage bonds are downgraded, the financial institutions that own them must raise more cash in order to meet liquidity regulations. To hold AAA-rated paper, banks, and other financial institutions need only to maintain $0.56 in capital for each $100 of paper. But as the paper is downgraded, the amount of capital they're required to hold goes up, exponentially. At a BBB rating, financial institutions must hold $4.80 of capital. At BBB-, they must hold $8 of capital per $100 of asset-backed securities. Thus, as the crisis worsens, the demand for capital from these firms could grow substantially.

We can't know what will happen. And, as we can't know, we must stand aside when our trailing stop losses are hit. As I wrote, back in early July, about American Home Mortgage:

Speculation on Wall Street is that “Alt-A” debt will be downgraded next. Most of the loans held by American Home Mortgage are considered “Alt-A” because they have adjustable rates. Even with the high credit scores of the company's borrowers, if rating agencies downgrade the bonds it holds, the company's solvency will certainly come into doubt. Whether this happens or not is a moot point for us: Our speculation hasn't panned out. We should have realized it sooner... but in a few more weeks we might be very glad we got out while we could.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry
Baltimore, Maryland
August 14, 2007

[ricmund]

bohužel toho jsem se bál na druhou stranu je jasný, že tohle je "málo" na to jak velký je to průser

[ricmund]

http://ipoint.financninoviny.cz/doporuc ... -trhy.html

konečně něco co není anglicky

[radvan]

tazko povedat ako to cele dopadne ... v kazdom pripade az sa zacne usadzovat prach bude dobra chvila hladat co v tom prachu stoji za to kupit ... teraz je dobra chvila tak maximalne na short

[Honzajs]

Velké banky podle mne ještě největší sešup před sebou.
Short banky už mám, dnes jsem opětovně navýšil pozici v GORO, nyní už na 15% portfolia

[Bobikpp]

Co takto zalozit diskusiu GORO? Filip?
Mozem sa spytat Honzajs, preco tak velmi tomu GORO veris? Mas nejake dobre informacie alebo tipy na zaklade ktorych si sa rozhodol pre tuto investiciu? Dik - Ja len tak ciste zo zvedavosti

[kadu]

Co takto zalozit diskusiu GORO? Filip?
Mozem sa spytat Honzajs, preco tak velmi tomu GORO veris? Mas nejake dobre informacie alebo tipy na zaklade ktorych si sa rozhodol pre tuto investiciu? Dik - Ja len tak ciste zo zvedavosti

GORO uz tezi a je profitova, ma udajne velke naleziste ktera jsou potvrzena snad na XX let dopredu. Snad to kratce staci..
Jeste, ze firma se chova pro-akcionarky a zbytecne nestepi akcie...

[Honzajs]

Zajímavá skutečnost:

banky obecně dnes silně rostly, ale v afterclose přišly o veškeré dnešní zisky...

[Honzajs]

Názorné vysvětlení CDO a podobných CP od MITu

http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Urban-S ... h20new.pdf

[ricmund]

Napiš sem něco pozitivního o CDO, pokus se o to prosím Jinak ten link je super

[kadu]

Názorné vysvětlení CDO a podobných CP od MITu

http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Urban-S ... h20new.pdf

Co je to na strane 32 v tom grafu to ABS?
Chapu dobre ze 2001 nejvetsi podil CDO drzeli banky... a ze jen behem 10 let se drzeni preneslo ve vetsi mire i na ABS (nevim co to je)
Spousta drzi stat i Pojistovny... Jsou nakej aktualnejsi data?


PS: slozite k pochopeni pro nefinancnika, ale k nakemu obrazku skvele

[Honzajs]

ABS... Assets Based Securities, tedy CP odvozené od jiných aktiv (třeba pohledávek) - tedy deriváty.
Na grafu je názorně vidět jejich prudký růst, který se od roku 2001 navíc ještě urychlil.

CDO jsou tak podmnožinou ABS.

Něco pozitivního o CDO - no, nic moc mne nenapadá, tedy až na to, že ne všechny CDO jsou zdrojem problémů, záleží na tom, z jakých pohledávek se skládají.

[Honzajs]

Trochu jiný pohled na snížení diskontní sazby Fedu:

What do I think about the FED cutting the discount rate?

I’m so happy you asked.

Since the whole weekend has passed and all of you have probably heard every talking head discuss what it “really means,” I'll spare you the technicalities and get into the meat of the issue.

The truth is that I'm flipping ticked about it. That's right - ticked off, upset, mad as heck-fire. (Editor's Note: "heck-fire" isn't in Dylan's vocabulary. Yes, in case you were wondering, I edited this.)

How can I be upset with an interest rate cut that may have averted a market panic, and which led to a market rebound of over 228 points?

Because I don’t want to help ANY INVESTOR – let alone manic depressive crybaby investors like Jim Cramer – avoid feeling a little pain when the market drops! (To see Jim Cramer act less professional than a second year stockbroker, view the YouTube video here.)

I mean come on folks! This isn’t just about Jim Cramer making money. Wall Street brokers, private equity firms, hedge funds, mortgage brokers and you-name-it have made a fortune for the past 5 years or so. And it’s about time to pay the piper – that’s the way the game is played, ladies and gentlemen.

But the real reason I’m so upset is that Bernanke may just have caused investors like me to miss out on millions of dollars in profits (and I’m not talking FIGURATIVELY here).

That’s because last Thursday's market action was the first time I began to feel authentic panic in the stock market since September 2001.

When the market re-opened after 9/11 – and I tell you this in the most unashamed way I can muster – I BOUGHT A LOT OF STOCKS AT CHEAP PRICES AND MADE A KILLING IN 2002 and 2003.

I remember it like it was yesterday: American Express (SYM: AXP) selling for $18/share! JP Morgan (SYM: JPM) selling for $22 per share. Shaw Communications (SYM: SJR) dropping from $20 to $6! H & R Block (SYM: HRB) was selling for $8!

It was like a parade right in front of my very eyes! Only in this parade, there weren't any floats, there were ticker symbols – and each one screamed "BUY! BUY! BUY!"

At first, I swear, I thought it was an illusion. Was this what the old timers meant when they used to talk about gaining a level of clarity so powerful that you're able to transcend the noise, the fear and the panic and begin your market operations?

ABSOLUTELY IT WAS!

And that’s the way I began to feel on Thursday! For the first time since 2001, people were so scared that they were RUNNING FOR THE EXITS.

Opportunities like that come across only once or twice in a decade!

In the end, does the Fed’s action mean the market has already seen its floor (and we’ve been “robbed” of our killing here)?

Who knows.

But I’ll tell you: whenever I see men like Jim Cramer, or private equity firms, or Wall Street talking heads cry about the pain of what is really a natural correction ... it makes we want to puke.

Manipulating the market may work for the short-term, but if risk-premiums stay as low as they have, by my word, there will be a day of reckoning for careless investors in the long-term.

And it’s times like that when clear-headed investors have opportunities to double or triple their NET WORTH.

You bet I’ll be first in line.

— Dylan

[ricmund]

Vrtá mi hlavou jedna věc:

PROČ ECB intervenuje násobně víc než Fed
Čeho se bojí? Jsou snad evropské banky v ještě větších "s...ch" než americké?

asi je

Přestože krize v americkém realitním sektoru dále eskalovala, americká centrální banka byla přinucena ulevit krizí postiženému finančnímu sektoru snížením diskontní sazby o 50 bazických bodů, dolar překvapivě vůči euru získal a pár EUR/USD sestoupil na desetitýdenní minimum (1,3358). Za skutečností, že euro nedokázalo vůbec nic vytěžit ze situace, kdy se objevují první známky problémů v americké ekonomice, stály totiž překvapivé problémy na evropském mezibankovním trhu, který trpí jako ostatní trhy nedostatkem likvidity. ECB dokonce byla přinucena pumpovat do systému likviditu v ještě větší míře než tomu bylo v posledních dnech u jiných centrálních bank světa včetně Fedu. Tím do jisté míry utrpěla kredibilita přísné měnové politiky ECB, na které byly vystavěny zisky eura vůči ostatním měnám.

[Honzajs]

Sleduje někdo vývoj USD / JPY?

Vzhledem k nízkým úrokovým sazbám v Japonksu byl velmi oblíbený tzv. Carry trade - půjčka v jenech, investice do US cenných papírů nesoucí mnohem vyšší úroky a poté prodej a splacení půjčky v jenech.

Jenomže v posledních pár dnech JPY slušně posílil, což nadělalo starosti řadě investorů (hlavně těm s pákou).

[jonatanus]

Sleduje někdo vývoj USD / JPY?

Vzhledem k nízkým úrokovým sazbám v Japonksu byl velmi oblíbený tzv. Carry trade - půjčka v jenech, investice do US cenných papírů nesoucí mnohem vyšší úroky a poté prodej a splacení půjčky v jenech.

Jenomže v posledních pár dnech JPY slušně posílil, což nadělalo starosti řadě investorů (hlavně těm s pákou).

ono usd/jpy ma zrejme z velkej casti na svedomi aj korekciu z 27. februara...
longovat dolar voci jenu uz prestava byt taky dobry napad... aj ked BOJ teraz zrejme nezvysi..

[ricmund]

Hedge fondy mají už hooodně stažené půlky. Jelikož mají obavu aby se neobrátil ten carry trade proti nim. Mám pocit, že v tom lednu to bylo díky zvýšení úrokových sazeb v Japonsku (nechce se mi to hledat jestli to byl leden) každopádně to první zvýšení po té neuvěřitelně dlouhé době deflace a celkové krizi bankovního sektoru. Japonsko sleduju a myslím, že je tam velký potenciál i když to může trvat ještě roky. Držím nějakou část portfolia ve fondu zaměřeného na Japonsko, protože tam žádné konkrétní tipy nemám.

[Ferin007]

Jo jo, moje úvahy se ubírají podobným směrem, ale nad korunovým výsledkem zatím pláču. Ostatně, už v období 2005-2006 rostlo Japonsko asi o 50 %, ale na korunovým účtu se to nijak neprojevilo.

[ricmund]

Je pravda, že posilování koruny (a v tomto případě ještě oslabovaní yenu) jde brutálně proti nám a bohužel tomu asi není konec. To je jeden z důvodů proč koukám i na tu naší burzu..českou...střediskovou

[filip glasa]

Treba sa poobzerať po hedgingu koruny - zabezpečení menového rizika. Ale ten hedging samozrejme môže ísť aj proti nám.
Ináč dolár a yen klasá aj voči iným menám, nie len voči korune. Cesta je asi rozumné investovanie po celom svete.

[filip glasa]

česky o CDO:
http://www.patria.cz/Zpravodajstvi/1050 ... izika.html

ešte že nám to tá patria prekladá

Mňa v tejto téme zaujíma - kedy ísť do spadnutých bánk? Podľa čoho posúdiť, že už poklesli hlbšie ako samotný problém? Kedy sa im začne blískať na lepšie časy?

[pav_12000]

Mňa v tejto téme zaujíma - kedy ísť do spadnutých bánk? Podľa čoho posúdiť, že už poklesli hlbšie ako samotný problém? Kedy sa im začne blískať na lepšie časy?

To by zaujímalo aj mňa a isto aj mnoho ďalších. Nájde sa niekto, kto má na tieto otázky odpoveď, alebo aspoň nejaký názor? Ladis, čo si myslíš o vývoji v RBS?

[Honzajs]

Při investování do bank pozor na jednu věc: do problémů se může dostati zdravá banka, která ani netratila na investicích do CDO...

Třeba kvůli velikosti jejich derivátových pozic, které násobně přesahují jejich vlastní kapitál. Jejich riziko je totiž ukryto v následujícím: BANKY MOHOU REÁLNĚ TRATIT I NA PAPÍROVĚ ZISKOVÝCH POZICÍCH

Pouze cca 1/10 jejich derivátových pozic jsou kontrakty obchodovatelné na burzách. Zbylých 90% jsou kontrakty uzavřené přímo s jiným subjektem a jejich plnění je tak závislé na solventnosti protistrany.

Takže - jestliže z důvodů špatných investic krachne protistrana, banka nemá jak realizovat své zisky a utrpí reálnou ztrátu, i když dosud vykazovala papírový zisk (t.j. stála na správné straně spekulace).

Ke dnu tak paradoxně může být i banka, která investovala správně, ale její protistranou byli ti, co investovali velmi špatně (ztrátové kontrakty výrazně převyšovaly ty ziskové).

Řetězová reakce by pak byla nejhorším myslitelným scénářem, proto centrální banky hustí do systému likviditu jak to jenom jde.



P.S. Rotace sektorů je ve světě běžná věc. Nic neroste věčně. Bankovní sektor rostl cca 25 let, podíl finančních institucí v SP500 se za tu dobu zněkolikanásobil a nyní se pohybuje kolem 25%. Podle mne je na řadě ústup bank ze slávy (pokles jejich podílu, tedy relativně horší výkonnost oproti zbytku trhu)

P.P.S. Pokud tedy chce někdo do bank s víceletým investičním horizontem, doporučuji mu velmi selektivní stock picking a VELMI důkladnou analýzu banky. Ne jenom pár poměrových ukazatelů.

P.P.P.S. Asi jste chtěli slyšet něco jiného, ale tohle je můj názor

[filip glasa]

Veľkosť derivátových pozícií ale namám možnosť zistiť a už vôbec nie kto je protistrana.

Žiadny sektor už nemusí zažiť rovanký boom ako v minulosti. To ale neznamená, že sa doňho za určitých okolností nevyplatí investovať.

[Honzajs]

Veľkosť derivátových pozícií ale namám možnosť zistiť a už vôbec nie kto je protistrana.

Žiadny sektor už nemusí zažiť rovanký boom ako v minulosti. To ale neznamená, že sa doňho za určitých okolností nevyplatí investovať.

Proto mluvím důkladné analýze a velmi selektivním stock pickingu. A být si vědom rizik.

[filip glasa]

Niečo málo v Češtine:
http://www.finmag.cz/clanek/489/

[Honzajs]

Myslím, že jsem našel indikátor, jak poznat, že krize nekončí, ale že půjde do tuhého.

Zatím roste počet nesplácených hypoték, ale nikde se nemluví o nesplácených úvěrech na kreditkách. Vypadá to tedy, že množství nesplácených úvěrů u kreditních karet zatím nijak dramaticky neroste.

Pokud začne výrazněji růst i počet nesplácených úvěrů z kreditek, půjde podle mne opravdu do tuhého. Jestliže totiž nebudou klienti splácet ani hypotéky ani úvěry z kreditek, kdo bude nakupovat, utrácet?

V takovém případě by stálo za zvážení put buď na Mastercard nebo možná i Wall Mart či jiné firmy závislé svými tržbami na "chudších" spotřebitelích.
Může se to odrazit i v Číně? Asi ano, jestliže většina zboží ve Wall Martech je z Číny...

Je to moc přitažené za vlasy? Co si o tom myslíte?

[ricmund]

Přitažený za vlasy to rozhodně není!!! Doufám-že budeš informovat.? Vždyť ve státech bez kreditky nejsi nikdo, takže to musí mít velkou vypovídací hodnotu. Dobrá práce Honzajs

[Larus]

Honzajs: zrovna dneska jsem četl, že množství peněz půjčených na kreditky roste v poslední době v USA výrazně rychleji, než výdělky a že to vypadá, že kreditky jsou poslední zdroj půjček pro Američany, když vyschly hypotéky. Zapomněl jsem, kde jsem to četl. Každopádně mi to, cos napsal, připadá smysluplné, pokud by opravdu větší množství lidí zasáhlo zdražení hypoték v kombinaci se zpomalující ekonomikou, rostoucí nezaměstnaností a (náhlou) neochotou bank půjčovat lidem se špatným credit rating třebas i přes kreditku atp. Nedokážu odhadnout, jak moc se cukne Wall Mart po oznámení růstu počtu nesplácených kreditek, opravdu by to byl velký pohyb?
Pořád zvažuju, jestli si trochu nepojistit pozici v JPM zakoupením put opce se strikem +- na dnešní ceně a expirací např. březen 2008. Dávalo by to aspoň trochu smysl? Nechce se mi prodávat ty akcie, chci je mít napořád a spíš dokupovat, ale malý hedge proti poklesu by zrovna teď asi neškodil, i když už jsem propásl ten předchozí pokles. Spočítal jsem, že by mě to stálo cca 10% pozice, jakou mám. Zahlédl jsem nějakou hrůzostrašnou statistiku, kde to vypadalo, že při minulých nemovitostních krizích klesala zrovna JPM třeba i přes 50%. Kdyby to bylo tak, na těch opcích bych se docela zahojil, ne? Když nespadne, bude mě to stát těch 10% a na akciích o nic nepřijdu.

[Honzajs]

Objem úvěrů na kreditky roste, počet nesplácených taky, i když zatím ne dramaticky.

Co se týče Wall Martu - šlo mi spíše o efekt "utahování opasků" a snahu lidí tolik neutrácet a s ním spojený pokled tržeb Wall Martu, než o přímý dopad nesplácení kreditek

Co se týče JPM, já jsem velmi skeptický k bankovnímu sektoru obecně. Speciálně na JPM již put opce mám. Tu statistiku, o které mluvíš, jsem viěl taky. Takže, jestli se chceš jistit, podívej se po nějaké put opci. Pokud akcie nespadne pod Tvůj strike, opce propadne.

Zvaž proto možnost nákupu "in-the-money" opce, tedy opce se strikem nad stávajcí cenou akcie. Jsou sice dražší, ale o peníze an opci bys naopak přišel jenom v případě růstu ceny akcie. Což by Ti asi vyhovovalo víc.

V Tvém případě dlouhodobého držení bych doporučoval spíše "in-the-money" opci nebo dokonce vůbec žádnou akcie.
Pokud totiž chceš držet JPM dlouhodobě, zvaž, jestli má podobná akce vůbec cenu, zda v případě poklesu nekoupit akcie.

Finální rozhodnutí je ale jen a jen na Tobě.

[Honzajs]

KISS:
https://image.minyanville.com/assets/FC ... minoes.jpg

[Larus]

Zajímavé čtení:

http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/In ... spx?page=1

[radvan]

http://reality.etrend.sk/115028/realitn ... siahol-dno

sranda este len zacina ...

[8x]

http://reality.etrend.sk/115028/realitn ... siahol-dno

sranda este len zacina ...

No parada!

[Bobikpp]

teoreticky by to nemusela byt az tak zla zprava...lacnejsie peniaze = ti co maju vyriesene byvanie si mozu v klude poziciat "za lacno" peniaze a venovat sa tradingu - nie?

[8x]

Parada v tom, ze sa bude nakupovat.

[Honzajs]

Řekl bych, že druhé kolo poklesů bank je tu. Padají velké banky (C, JPM, BAC...), výrazně klesá i Moody's, Citibank ji již přirovnáván k Enronu, Northern Rock je nucena si půjčit 42 miliard USD...

Put banky (C, BAC) splatné 2009 držím i nadále.