Německý ústavní soud rozhoduje o budoucnosti eurozóny

[Honzajs]

Mnozí investoři se dnes shodují, že euro je v ohrožení a že mu dokonce hrozí zánik. Velké debaty se ovšem vedou o tom, kdy by k němu mohlo dojít. V těchto debatách poněkud zapadá fakt, že ohrožené není jen euro a eurozóna, ale také budoucnost Evropské unie. A to možná dřív, než by se čekalo.

Počkejme do zítřka, budeme moudřejší. Více informací k tomuto tématu mám zde: http://proinvestory.cz/nemecko-euro-investice" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

[Rokosák]

Euro rozhodne zanikne. Odhadujem, ze tak okolo roku 2150. Zato exoticke meny ako madarsky Forint, ceska Koruna a polsky (ani neviem co tam maju) preziju minimalne do roku 2151.

[Honzajs]

Kdybyste ubral tak 138-137 let, souhlasil bych

[radvan]

Ústavný súd schválil účasť Nemecka na eurovale
Súd ale dospel k záveru, že príspevok Nemecka do tzv. eurovalu je legálny, ale v budúcnosti ho bude musieť schváliť aj parlamentný výbor, ktorého súhlas však vláda nemá istý.



Čítajte viac: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/6044683/ustav ... z1XGKRMjv9" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

[Honzajs]

Zaregistroval jsem.
Mimochodem, dneska večer vyjde na proinvestory volné pokračování, tedy jaký scénář se mi zdá jako nejpravděpodobnější

[Rokosák]

Svajciarsky bankovy priemysel vcera kopol Euro-pesimistov do rozkroku. Frank je de facto stanoveny na 1.20+ co znamena, ze za meny, ktore sa pouzili na nakup SWF sa budu kupovat nemecke, francuzske ba dokonca slovenske dlhopisy.

[Honzajs]

Jakot to dopadne s eurem?
Podle mě takhle: http://proinvestory.cz/blizi-se-dvourychlostni-eurozona" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

[Rokosák]

Ak ma tu istu menu Kalifornia a Missouri, Moskva a Magadan tak ju mozu mat aj Pariz a Pireus ci Berlin a Budejovice. Treba len trosku viac politickej integracie spolocnej Europy. Ekonomicke problemy roznych regionov prispeju k motivacii celoeuropskej sudrznosti. Sice nie az tolko ako geopoliticke ci vojenske hrozby USA a Ciny. Mozno i Ruska. My Europania nemame na vyber. Bud budeme spolocne napredovat, alebo nas roztriestenych zozeru zaziva.

[radvan]

honzajs:

toto si cital?
http://www.scribd.com/doc/64020390/xrm45126" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

dobra analyza ... v podstate 2 cesty ... alebo silnejsia fiskalna unia ... alebo totalny kolaps a chaos ... jedine mi tam chyba spracovany scenar na nutene vyhodenie clena z EU -> grecka napr. ...

najzaujimavejsie su tie casti, co by to znamenalo pre nemecko ak by opustilo Euro napr.:

The economic argument if a strong country leaves

A strong secessionist is unlikely to see a run on its banking system, as there is
no reason for depositors to withdraw their money over fear of its value being
debauched. Indeed, to the extent that non-secessionist residents are able to evade
capital controls, there may well be international inflows into bank deposits.
However, this does not mean that the banking system survives the trauma of
currency break-up intact.
The problem for banks is, of course, the balance sheet. A seceding country’s
banking system will now have NNC (new currency) liabilities. Against that, however, will be a
collection of assets from the former Euro area, some of which may have been
redenominated into the NNC, but some of which will have remained in the rump
Euro currency (or worse). If the NNC appreciates 40% or 50% against the rump
Euro, it will almost certainly necessitate the recapitalisation of the banking
system. That in turn will impose some fiscal burden on the seceding government
(presumably) – which while it may not provoke default is likely to put some
strain on domestic fiscal policy.

4. Trade, tariffs and protectionism
The strong seceding country would effectively have to write off its export
industry. Outside the EU, the export sector of a strong seceding country is at a
competitive disadvantage against its principal competitors in its principal export
market. There is little reason to suppose that the rump Euro would welcome a
continuation of the free trade aspects of the EU with an apostate state.
This trade shock is made worse by any appreciation of the NNC (ironically the
problem that Switzerland faces today). This is exactly the issue that worried
Germany pre-Euro. An exit from the EMU of a stronger country (or countries)
would create severe tensions in rump Euro financial markets, encouraging a
flight to quality. This capital flow would trigger a very rapid appreciation of the
new currency. Not only would the currency move have a large adverse impact
on the country’s exports (loss of competitiveness, but also because of the jump
in volatility), but also the central bank would lose part of the control it has on
the monetary base.
As if were not bad enough, it is not plausible to suggest that a strong country
could secede without any consequences for the former friends it has left behind.
If a strong country was to leave it would mark a “crossing of the Rubicon” – a
visible demonstration that the “irrevocable” monetary union can in fact be
revoked. This would then immediately apply pressure to the weaker states in the
Euro area, creating a further centrifugal force. The ensuing domestic demand
consequences would probably mimic our scenario analysis, and in turn would
remove export markets from play.
Thus, any strong country seeking to secede would have to assume that the
majority of its export sector is wiped out in the process.

obcianska vojna v principe ... ak by nemecko opustilo EU, tak si zlikviduje priemysel a nasere zvysok europy ... buy buy mier v EU ...

rozpad Eura by bol event v style ako ked sa rozpadal sovietsky zvaz resp. sovietsky blok -> velka, silna globalna ekonomika, ktora je jadrova velmoc sa rozpadne na vnutornych treniciach ... a teraz si skusme predstavit ako sa zacali natahovat vsetky tie nastupnicke staty v byvalom rusku ... zacali vznikat kadejake miestne mafianske vlady ... preneste si to do europy ...

Taking Germany as an example of a stronger country, the combination of these
costs works out at between EUR6,000 and EUR8,000 per person if Germany
were to leave the Euro. As with a weak country leaving, the recapitalisation of
the banking system can be considered to be a one-off event. However, the
legacy of the risk premium and the problems of trade would entail a cost of
between EUR3,500 and EUR4,500 per person per year after the initial shock.
To put this into context, if Greece, Ireland and Portugal all defaulted on their
debt with a 50% haircut, and the remainder of the Euro area bought all
outstanding government debt in the market (including IMF debt), that would
generate a cost of a little over EUR1,000 per person in Germany.

With this degree of social dislocation, the historical parallels are unappealing.
Past instances of monetary union break-ups have tended to produce one of two
results. Either there was a more authoritarian government response to contain or
repress the social disorder (a scenario that tended to require a change from
democratic to authoritarian or military government), or alternatively, the social
disorder worked with existing fault lines in society to divide the country, spilling
over into civil war. These are not inevitable conclusions, but indicate that
monetary union break-up is not something that can be treated as a casual issue of
exchange rate policy.

k tomuto rozpadu US montary unie nemate niekto viac clankov?

Even the US monetary union break-up in 1932-33 was accompanied by
something close to authoritarianism. Roosevelt’s inauguration was described by
a contemporary journalist as being conducted in “a beleaguered capital in
wartime”, with machine guns covering the Mall. State militia were called out to
deal with the reactions of local populations, unhappy at what had happened to
the monetary union (and specifically their access to their banks).

pripadne k tomuto niekto mate nieco viac?

Our base case for the Euro is that the monetary union will hold together, with
some kind of fiscal confederation (providing automatic stabilisers to economies,
not transfers to governments). This is how the US monetary union was
resurrected in the 1930s. It is how the UK monetary union, and indeed the
German monetary union, have held together.

zaver sa zhodneme ...

But what if the disaster scenario happens? How can investors invest if they
believe in a break-up, however low the probability? The simple answer is that
they cannot. Investing for a break-up scenario has not guaranteed winners within
the Euro area. The growth consequences are awful in any break-up scenario. The
risk of civil disorder questions the rule of law, and as such basic issues such as
property rights. Even those countries that avoid internal strife and divisions will
likely have to use administrative controls to avoid extreme positions in their
markets.

The only way to hedge against a Euro break-up scenario is to own no Euro
assets at all.

[Honzajs]

Jo, zaujaly mě ty částky.

[radvan]

mna by zaujimali priklady tych menovych unii ... ze ako bolo vyriesene, ze tie unie fungovali ...

lebo Euro nie je prvy pokus o takuto menovu uniu a zjavne su pripady, ked to nejako fungovalo aj pri krajinach, ktore su totalne odlisne ... a stale funguje -> vid. US, kde by niektore staty boli lokalna velmoc aj same o sebe a ine su ako grecko v Europe - chronicky nemocny ... US neni dobry priklad, lebo to ma uz za sebou 150 rokov integracie (ak berieme za start integracie koniec obcianskej vojny, kedy prestali fungovat ako konfederacia) ... ale tie problemy US v 30tych rokoch by mohli byt lepsi priklad, kedze vtedy este neboli tak silne integrovane ... pripadne ako fungovala UK alebo Nemecka menova unia ...

to ma vacsi zmysel riesit ako to co sa stane, ked sa rozpdne euro ... lebo ked sa rozpadne euro, tak sa mozme tak zacat modlit ... lebo mat zlato je sice fajn ... ale mat zlato v rusku v obdobi, ked sa rozpadal sovietsky zvaz nemuselo nic znamenat (resp. mohlo znamenat, ze to zlato clovek vymenil v kratkom case za olovo) ...

[Pette]

Rozpad eurozony su len tlachaniny pre media...

Nemci maju presne to, co vzdy chceli - nadvladu nad Europou, teraz cez svoju menu (neklamme si, € je len novy nazov nemeckej marky...

Preto, rozpad nehrozi a nejake vylucenie Grecka nie je v nikoho zaujme, aj keby im mali platit cely rozpocet a prevziat ich komplet dlhy, stale sa bavime v horizonte 10-20-30 rokov o ziskovom projekte pre 80 milionov Nemcov.

Nemci bez Europy a bez sirokeho pouzivania Eura nie su supervelmoc a dobre si to uvedomuju.

[Honzajs]

Zda, se eurozóna rozpadne,či nikoliv,ukáže čas. Podle mě ano.